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Abstract
Considering recent re-assessments of Pareto and Mosca, I discuss whether these thinkers’ socio-political orientations con-
tribute to the ‘disfiguration’ of democracy (in: Urbinati, Democracy disfigured: opinion, truth, and the people, Harvard, 
Cambridge, MA, 2014) or provide a resource for the renewal of democratic institutions. Femia (Pareto and political theory, 
Routledge, Abingdon, 2006) presents Pareto as being in the “Machiavellian tradition of sceptical liberalism,” revealing the 
liberal potential of Pareto’s realist political theory. Finocchiaro (Beyond right and left, Yale, New Haven, London, 1999) 
ameliorates the conservative consequences of Mosca’s thought by reinterpreting him as a ‘democratic elitist,’ who holds a 
conception of political liberty “as a relationship such that authority flows from the masses to the elites.” Highlighting the 
significance of internal tensions within each thinker’s work foregrounded by these readings, between the causal primacy of 
psychic states and the ‘mutual dependence’ of social factors (Pareto), and between the elite principle and ‘balanced pluralism’ 
(Mosca), I ask whether the ‘sceptical liberal’ Pareto or the ‘democratic elitist’ Mosca elude Urbinati’s unpolitical, populist 
and plebiscitarian ‘disfigurations’ of democracy.
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1 Introduction
In Democracy Disfigured, Nadia Urbinati diagnoses three 
‘disfigurations,’ which she terms ‘unpolitical,’ ‘populist’ and 
‘plebiscitarian,’ that obstruct the operation of well-function-
ing democracies, understood as “government[s] by means 
of opinion” (Urbinati 2014, p. 2).1 These immanent meta-
morphoses threaten, what for Urbinati is, (representative) 
democracy’s essential feature, namely the ‘diarchic’ separa-
tion between the ‘will’ of sovereign citizens and the ‘judg-
ment’ of public opinion.2 The first ‘unpolitical’ disfiguration 
privileges the ‘epistemic’ moment of cognition and expert 
opinion. The second ‘populist’ disfiguration radicalises the 
‘acclamatory’ aspect of opinion and polarises the public 
forum. Finally, ‘plebiscitarian’ democracy reduces public 
opinion to a passive ‘ocular,’ aesthetic and non-rational, role. 
Urbinati’s framework is a useful measure against which to 
re-examine so-called classical ‘elite theory’ and to consider 
the challenges to democracy in the twenty-first century. This 
article reviews established readings of Vilfredo Pareto and 
Gaetano Mosca (Aron 1950, 1974; Meisel 1962; Bottomore 
1966; Finer 1966), as well as recent re-evaluations of their 
thought (Bellamy 1987, 2014; Finocchiaro 1999; Femia 
2006). It assesses the extent to which the orientation pro-
vided to social and political theory by this ‘Italian School’ 
contributes to these ‘disfigurations,’ or, through their cri-
tique of existing democratic practices, is a resource for the 
renewal and extension of democratic institutions.
The discussion of Pareto and Mosca reflects on interpre-
tative disagreements found in these expositions and consid-
ers the implications of these differences for their relation-
ship to democracy. Disputing the contention that illiberal 
tendencies in Pareto’s thought incline his work towards a 
proto-fascistic politics, Joseph Femia represents Pareto’s  * Robert P. Jackson 
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methodological individualism and hostility to specula-
tive abstraction as being in the “Machiavellian tradition of 
sceptical liberalism” (Femia 2006, p. 128). Taking up the 
Paretian notion of ‘residues’ and its consequences for the 
Enlightenment conception of reason, Femia finds Pareto’s 
sceptical approach pre-figurative of some post-modernist 
themes that demystify uncritical narratives of progress. Con-
trary to less sympathetic readings (such as Bellamy 1987, 
2014), this appears to reveal a liberal potential in Pareto’s 
thought conceived as a realist political theory. Revisiting 
the critique of Mosca advanced by Antonio Gramsci in 
his Prison Notebooks (1971,1975), Maurice Finocchiaro 
(1999) reinterprets both thinkers’ views on democracy and 
elitism. Despite the traditional characterisation of Gramsci 
and Mosca as hailing from opposite poles of the Left–Right 
spectrum, Finocchiaro argues that they are proponents of 
the same tradition of ‘democratic elitism’ in political theory 
(distinct from that theorised later by Schumpeter et al.). In 
this view, both thinkers present a conception of political 
liberty “as a relationship such that authority flows from the 
masses to the elites” (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 206). This ame-
liorates the conservative consequences of Mosca’s thought. 
These readings chime with Natasha Piano’s account of the 
genealogy of ‘democratic elitism,’ in which she argues that 
the dominant interpretation of this Italian tradition (e.g., by 
Dahl and his successors) minimises Pareto’s and Mosca’s 
concern to contain “plutocracy in the age of mass politics” 
(Piano 2019, p. 525).
After reviewing these interpretations of Pareto and Mosca 
‘against the grain’ of conventional wisdom, I reflect on them 
using Urbinati’s framework of ‘unpolitical,’ ‘populist’ and 
‘plebiscitarian’ disfigurations of democracy. I ask whether 
the ‘sceptical liberal’ Pareto or the ‘democratic elitist’ 
Mosca manage to evade ‘disfiguring’ democracy, undermin-
ing Urbinati’s diarchic separation between the “free forum 
of public opinion” and the “governmental institutions that 
enact the will of the people” (Urbinati 2014).
2  ‘Elite Theory’ and Democracy
Raymond Aron affiliates Pareto with a generation (includ-
ing Durkheim, Weber and, we might add, Mosca) that came 
of age in the second half of the nineteenth century during 
a period of relative peace and stability, remote from the 
world-wide conflicts that engulfed succeeding generations 
(Aron 1974, p. 11). Despite this, these thinkers understood 
themselves to be living through a moment of profound crisis 
and transformation of European society. For Aron, a major 
theme of their work was to identify this crisis as emerging 
from the changing relations between science and religion, 
and the corresponding notions of reason and feeling. While 
Pareto and his contemporaries endorsed the latest advances 
in scientific thought, e.g. in Pareto’s emphasis on the ‘log-
ico-experimental method’ (Pareto 1966, pp. 171–174), they 
recognised this progress as having unintended consequences 
resulting from the challenge that it posed to religious faith 
and established beliefs. They saw religious and moral feeling 
as a major factor in providing stability to the social order. 
While this generation might not have mourned the waning 
of traditional religion and morality, its decline left them with 
questions about what might provide coherence to collective 
life in its stead. In various ways, these thinkers attempted to 
reconcile the horns of this dilemma, which Aron character-
ises, on the one hand, as a “need for scientific precision” to 
analyse society, and, on the other, as a commitment to the 
notion that science cannot substitute for the social knitting 
effect provided by the “indispensable illusions” of belief 
systems (Aron 1974, pp. 12–13).
For Pareto and Mosca, their attempt to provide a founda-
tion for a new science of politics was rooted in the notion, 
as Tom Bottomore explains, that “in every society there is, 
and must be, a minority which rules over the rest of society” 
(Bottomore 1966, p. 12).3 Mosca first articulated this asser-
tion of elite rule in 1884 in his Teorica dei governi e governo 
parlamentare (Mosca 1968), and subsequently in two edi-
tions of his Elementi di scienza politica (Mosca 1896/1923).4 
Pareto’s training as a mathematician is reflected in his Cours 
d’économie politique (Pareto 1896–1897) through his con-
cern with the distribution of wealth, power and influence 
in society. Bottomore detects a shift from Pareto’s earlier 
interest in the diffusion of attributes of various types along 
a “normal curve” to the stark opposition in The Mind and 
Society [Trattato di sociologia generale] (Pareto 1916/1935) 
between two distinct camps, the ‘governing elite,’ those who 
“directly or indirectly play some considerable part in govern-
ment,” and the masses (Bottomore 1966, p. 8). Pareto’s and 
Mosca’s attentiveness both to the internal structure of the 
“governing elite” (Pareto 1966) or the “ruling”/“political 
class” (Mosca 1939, 1966) and the relations between this 
elite and the masses emerges from their critique of exist-
ing democratic theory and is shaped by their experiences of 
parliamentary democracy.
As the son of a Mazzinian exiled in France, the young 
Pareto advocated democratic, republican and laissez-faire 
political ideas.5 However, during the period of trasformismo 
in Italian politics, Pareto became a critic of corrupt practices 
3 Aron defines “the élite” as “the minority which, in any society, per-
forms the function of ruling the community” (Aron 1950, p. 9).
4 I suspend adjudication on the ill-tempered dispute between Mosca 
and Pareto over the patrimony of the elite principle (Meisel 1962, pp. 
14–15, 170–183).
5 See Finer (1966) and Bellamy (1987) for biographical narratives of 
Pareto and Mosca.
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that he identified with parliamentarism. While Pareto dis-
played sympathy for ‘popular socialism,’ as Richard Bel-
lamy indicates, he regarded the Marxist vision of a class-
less society as a “dangerous utopia” (Bellamy 1987, p. 19).6 
Increasingly cynical in outlook, while recognising “pro-
found” insight in Marx’s conception of class struggle, by 
1902 Pareto began to distinguish his own theoretical vision 
through a critique of socialism in Les systèmes socialistes 
(Pareto 1902, II, p. 405).7 However, S.E. Finer argues that 
Pareto’s later work attests to a lasting preoccupation with 
the ideas of Marx. Thus, Finer sees Pareto’s Trattato as an 
attempt to “reduce Marxist propositions to special cases of a 
much more general theory” (Finer 1966, p. 77). James Mei-
sel suggests that Marx represents for Mosca a unique oppo-
nent who dislodged Mosca from his characteristic detached 
and scholarly approach into an impassioned denunciation 
(Meisel 1962, p. 169). Bellamy comments on the “remark-
ably Marxian” character of Mosca’s argumentation, con-
sidering his position as a “committed critic of socialism” 
(Bellamy 1987, p. 39).
Given the association of socialist ideas with the exten-
sion of democracy by many at this time, it is unsurprising 
that an anti-democratic label is often applied to Pareto’s 
and Mosca’s thought.8 The association of classical ‘elite 
theory’ (via Robert Michels) with the anti-democratic col-
lective and crowd psychology developed by figures such as 
Gustave Le Bon, Scipio Sighele, and Gabriel Tarde, rein-
forces this notion (Nye 1977; Bellamy 2014, pp. 224–231). 
Bellamy points to a dilemma confronting interpreters of 
Pareto’s work, caught between two images: of a classical 
liberal economist valorising market mechanisms and indi-
vidual rational choice and a socio-political theorist “exalting 
the use of force by an elite to impose its will on the popu-
lace,” the latter invoked by Mussolini to legitimate fascism 
(Bellamy 1987, p.12).9 Bellamy refutes the idea of a schism 
between Pareto’s earlier economics and his later “crude and 
illiberal” views, emphasising the continuity of the “concep-
tual scheme he employed to interpret human behaviour” 
(Bellamy 1987, pp. 12–13). Consequently, Bellamy regards 
Pareto as adopting a ‘moral relativism’ that, while not itself 
fascist, implicitly legitimated fascist and anti-democratic 
practices.10 In contrast, for Femia, Pareto “harboured a lin-
gering admiration for the democratic ideal,” and his frame-
work is more inconsistent than dangerous in its relativism 
(Femia 2006, pp. 120–121).11 Aligning with Cirillo (1983), 
Femia further argues that Pareto would have been a critic of 
fascism had he lived beyond 1923.12
Mosca’s scepticism towards mass democracy evolved 
during his career. Mosca had declared in 1904 that his 
opposition to “pure democracy” was a product of his liberal 
beliefs (Mosca 1949, p. 35). He subsequently voted against 
the extension of suffrage in parliament in 1912. However, 
Mosca does not endorse Le Bon’s conception that parlia-
ments necessarily operate with the mentality of crowds, pro-
vided a judicious approach “of impartial, reasoned debate 
amongst independent, educated representatives” prevails 
among the personnel of which they are constituted (Bellamy 
2014, p. 241). Thus, while Mosca maintains his anti-socialist 
impulse in his later writings, he re-assesses his opposition 
to democratic reform. According to Bellamy, Mosca “re-
conceptualised democratic theory away from the notion of 
popular majority rule and towards modern-day doctrines of 
pluralism” (Bellamy 1987, p. 42). Finocchiaro rejects the 
anti-democratic perception of Mosca’s “fundamental elit-
ist principle,” pointing to his articulation of this principle 
through a wider system of ideas, including his principle of 
“balanced pluralism” (Finocchiaro 1999, pp. 42–51).13 As 
we will see, this makes it difficult to associate his thought 
with the “anti-pluralist aspirations” of Urbinati’s ‘populist’ 
disfiguration of democracy (Urbinati 2014, p. 132). Mosca’s 
pluralism emerges from his diagnosis of socialism’s failure 
to disperse power, and, as Bellamy explains, is “not only 
for the separation of church and state but also for a division 
between polity and economy and, within the state, between 
the bureaucracy and the government, as well as a measure 
of decentralisation” (Bellamy 2014, p. 243).
While frequently invoked in common as canonical fig-
ures (along with Robert Michels) of so-called classical 
‘elite theory’, commentators (for differing reasons) have 
emphasised the need to distinguish Mosca’s and Pareto’s 
positions. Finocchiaro judges their association to have been 
unfortunate for Mosca, deeming him less susceptible to a 
6 Pareto (1966, p. 138) contrasts this type with ‘bourgeois’ socialism.
7 Femia notes the “cynicism” Pareto had “once directed against the 
reactionary bourgeoisie was now turned against the workers and their 
phoney champions” (Femia 1995, p. 378). In both cases, Pareto’s con-
cern is the “spoliation” of one group by another, the seizing of goods 
by legal or illegal means, and a consequent destruction of wealth 
(Finer 1966, p. 16).
8 For Meisel, “old-style liberals” regarded socialism and democracy 
as “twins […] up to no good” (Meisel 1962, p. vii).
9 For differing views on Pareto’s relation to fascism, see Vander 
Zanden (1960) and Cirillo (1983).
10 Gregor (2005, p. 120) similarly argues that Mosca is an intellec-
tual “pre-cursor” of fascism.
11 Finocchiaro expresses doubts about the democratic aspects of 
Pareto’s thought (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 262).
12 Bellamy also acknowledges that, had he lived, Pareto might have 
regarded “Mussolini’s regime as an archetypal ‘demagogic plutoc-
racy’” (Bellamy 2014, p. 241).
13 For Meisel, Mosca’s later articulation of “juridical defence” 
through his theory of “balance of the social forces” is constituted by 
“the social mechanisms that regulate this disciplining of the moral 
sense” (Meisel 1962, pp. 144–148; Mosca 1939, pp. 126–127; Bel-
lamy 2014, p. 241).
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“one-sided emphasis on elites” (Finocchiaro 1999, pp. 17, 
38). For Bellamy, while Pareto’s systematic construction 
of a ‘general sociology’ demonstrated “logical rigour,”14 
Mosca’s “impressionistic” and intuitive account has a greater 
flexibility to explain diverse historico-political situations 
(Bellamy 1987, p. 34).15 Femia characterises Pareto as more 
“cosmopolitan and intellectually ambitious” than Mosca, 
although, as we will see, roots both in the “Machiavellian 
desire to penetrate beneath constitutional forms and pious 
political rhetoric” (Femia 2006, p. 101). Bellamy contrasts 
Mosca’s preoccupation with “social and organisational” con-
cerns with the “psychological factors” (‘residues’) underly-
ing Pareto’s analysis (Bellamy 2014, p. 241).16 Bottomore 
distinguishes between Pareto’s and Mosca’s respective 
concepts of ‘governing elite’ and the ‘ruling’ or ‘political 
class,’ suggesting that the former contrasts organised and 
unorganised groups, whereas the latter opposes dominant 
and subject groups (Bottomore 1966, p. 36). Thus, Mosca’s 
concept suggests subject classes possess potential for organi-
sation, giving greater scope for the circulation of elites to be 
explained by the rise of new ‘social forces’. For Bottomore, 
this implies an affinity between Mosca’s ‘ruling class’ and 
the Marxian version of the same concept (Bottomore 1966, 
p. 37).17
Despite Pareto’s and Mosca’s hostility to Marxian social-
ism, we can frame their thought as the product of an opposi-
tional relation with that tradition, i.e., the development of a 
‘judicious’ approach of ‘balanced pluralism’ (Mosca) or of 
‘mutual dependence’ of social factors (Pareto) via the rejec-
tion of the economic determinism associated with Marxism. 
This relation between the ‘Italian School’ and Marxian argu-
mentation informs Femia and Finocchiaro’s re-appraisal of 
Pareto and Mosca. Their enduring engagement with Marx-
ism can be linked to their obscured critique of plutocracy 
in the ‘age of mass politics’.18 This section has highlighted 
Pareto’s and Mosca’s concern with new relations between 
reason and feeling, described by Gramsci as the recipro-
cal “passage from knowing to understanding to feeling” 
(Gramsci 1971, p. 418). It indicated their evolving attitudes 
towards socialism and democracy, and, finally, two distinct 
conceptions that are more judicious and pluralist than com-
monly assumed. Whether one accepts or rejects their out-
looks, rendering Pareto and Mosca in their most plausible 
form is a boon for contemporary democratic theory. Before 
reflecting on the extent to which their thought is ‘disfigur-
ing’ of democracy or a resource for its renewal, I will discuss 
Femia’s and Finocchiaro’s respective readings of Pareto and 
Mosca in more detail.
3  Pareto and ‘Sceptical Liberalism’
Femia argues that scholars have lavished little attention 
on Pareto compared to other ‘great’ political sociologists, 
such as Durkheim and Weber. The issue, suggests Femia, is 
partly the demanding nature of Pareto’s thought, particularly 
if familiarity with neo-classical economics is considered a 
pre-requisite for comprehending his social theory. For Aron, 
Pareto actively courted unpopularity by drawing attention to 
the gap between our “representations of the world” and an 
unpalatable reality (Aron 1974, p. 121).19 However, Pareto’s 
disinclination to make his work accessible also reflects his 
apprehension about causing “mass cynicism” by destroying 
illusions that underpin the social order (Femia 2006, p. 4). 
Thus, Pareto revives a conundrum attributed to Machiavelli’s 
Prince: if Machiavelli’s advice—that rulers maintain a pub-
lic façade of morality while acting ruthlessly for reasons of 
state—were to circulate among the people it would no longer 
be effective.20
Commentators argue that recognising the imprint of 
Machiavellianism on Pareto is “decisive” for an adequate 
interpretation of his thought (Aron 1974, p. 158).21 This 
influence is manifest in Pareto’s realist approach, which 
places “force and conflict at the heart of politics” (Femia 
2006, p. 3). Aron defines this tradition of “Machiavelli and 
Machiavellianism” as:
An attempt to see through the hypocrisies of the social 
comedy, to single out the true feelings that motivate 
men, to understand the true conflicts that make up the 
fabric of historical evolution, and consequently to pro-
19 For example, exposing “humanitarian” concern for others as the 
“rationalisation of self-interest” in disguise (Bellamy 1987, p. 32).
20 We can also read Machiavelli’s text in ironic or republican modes 
that intend such subversive or transformative outcomes.
21 Burnham (1943) counts Pareto among his pantheon of “modern” 
Machiavellians, including Sorel and Mosca.
14 See also Runciman (1963) and Livingston (in Mosca 1939).
15 Thus, Gramsci refers to Mosca’s Elementi as an “enormous hotch-
potch,” and his concept of ‘political class’ as “wavering and elastic” 
(Gramsci 1975, pp. 956, 972).
16 Aron distinguishes Pareto’s motivation from that of the “psycholo-
gist,” analytically classifying ‘residues’ (as “chief causes of non-logi-
cal actions”) as a guide to human behaviour, rather than studying sen-
timents in themselves (Aron 1974, pp. 125, 130).
17 Likewise, Meisel suggests Mosca’s ‘social forces’ are proximate to 
Marxian thought (Meisel 1962, p. 12).
18 Pareto’s and Mosca’s absorption of this theme represents an early 
example of, what today we might call, post-Marxism (like their con-
temporary Benedetto Croce).
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vide a vision stripped of all illusion as to what really 
constitutes social life (Aron 1974, p.16).22
For Bellamy, this Machiavellian concern with the “use 
of force and persuasion” to maintain power is a source 
of relativism in Pareto’s thought, since “no political goal 
could be regarded as more rational than any other” (Bellamy 
1987, p. 30). Indeed, Femia suggests that Pareto’s guiding 
thought, from Les systèmes socialistes onwards, was the 
“paramountcy of the non-rational in human affairs” (Femia 
2006, p. 9).
The co-ordinates of Pareto’s theoretical framework 
emerge from the opposition outlined above by Aron between 
the competing demands of scientific (‘logico-experimental’) 
analysis and non-rational, albeit socially useful, belief sys-
tems.23 Aron suggests that Pareto’s criticism of “metaphys-
ical rationalism” derives from an experimental rationalist 
perspective that pragmatically recognises the limitations 
of a progressive Enlightenment conception of “scientific 
reason” (Aron 1974, p. 168). While Pareto believes that 
modern scientific advances have led to a general historical 
increase in “the proportion of logico-experimental conduct,” 
he maintains an aversion towards imposing exhaustive “sci-
entific reason” as a principle of social cohesion (Aron 1974, 
p. 169).24 This stems in part from his pessimistic view of 
a historical correlation between scientific progress and the 
rise of an egoism corrosive to the community and social 
equilibrium. The combination of scepticism and pragma-
tism informing this experimental rationalism would make 
a useful contribution to Urbinati’s consideration of the 
‘unpolitical’ epistemic disfiguration of democracy (Urbinati, 
2014, p. 81). For Femia, Pareto is caught in an ambivalent 
position between his desire to dissolve all ‘metaphysical’ 
theories, and his contention that they constitute a “neces-
sary source of human action” (Femia 2006, p. 97). In the 
Trattato, Pareto provides a scientific classification of the 
quasi-rational explanations, which he terms ‘derivations,’ 
that human beings provide for this non-rational behaviour 
(‘non-logical actions’) (Pareto 1935).25 The latter originate, 
according to Pareto, in “definite psychic states, sentiments, 
subconscious feelings, and the like” (Pareto 1935, p. 88). 
The concrete manifestations of these states provide a set of 
data from which we can derive certain regularities in human 
thought and action, which Pareto refers to as ‘residues.’ 
While human beings derive satisfaction from ‘derivations,’ 
because they enable the belief that our actions are rational, 
Pareto suggests that the primary tendencies in human behav-
iour and thought are determined by these ‘residues.’26
For Aron, this dualistic schema of human behaviour, 
itself based on the “duality between logical and non-logical 
actions,” gives rise in turn to Pareto’s distinctive contribu-
tions to ‘elite theory,’ his dualistic typology of elites and 
his cyclical theory of the “circulation of elites” (Aron 1974, 
p. 183). This represents another Machiavellian influence 
in Pareto’s thought, namely Pareto’s adaptation of Machi-
avelli’s fox-lion metaphor to analyse the characteristics of 
different types of ‘governing elites.’27 The former type cor-
responds to those rulers with a preponderance of Class I resi-
dues (“the instinct of combinations”), and the latter to those 
with a surfeit of Class II (“the persistence of aggregates”). 
The former vulpine elites govern by consent, through their 
innovative character and persuasive cunning, whereas the 
latter conservative leonine elites rule by force, relying on 
their strength and a steadfast resolve. Pareto conceives a 
continual historical process of growth and decay of govern-
ing elites, punctuated by revolutionary “floods” that bring 
new elites to power, summarised in his dictum: “history is 
a graveyard of aristocracies” (Pareto 1935, p. 1430). In this 
cycle, the governing elite, with the ‘residues’ that equipped 
them to take power, tend to lose their vigour over time. They 
are confronted by new circumstances, requiring different 
‘residues,’ rendering them unable to maintain a social equi-
librium.28 The established elite are challenged by new elites 
of a different type that embody the ‘residues’ required by the 
new situation. Bargaining might postpone their overthrow, 
particularly if they are able to combine the qualities of coer-
cion with consent. Yet, ultimately, for Pareto, the cyclical 
nature of the “interplay between […] ‘circumstances’ and 
the distribution of psychological qualities” prevails (Femia 
2006, p. 74). The Machiavellian lesson, as Femia notes, is 
that “virtues become vices when circumstances change” 
(Femia 2006, p. 105).
This typology poses a challenge to Pareto’s claim to deter-
mine ‘residues’ in a scientific manner, i.e. to distinguish the 
process of abstraction of ‘residues’ from its entanglement 
with distorting ‘derivations.’ As Femia acknowledges, the 
interpretation of actual historical elites in terms of foxes and 
lions involves value-laden judgments about “the meaning 
22 Note Arendt’s concern with excessive forms of politics driven by 
unmasking hypocrisy (Arendt 1990, p. 99). See Femia (2006, p. 99) 
on Machiavelli’s and Pareto’s shared contempt for hypocrisy.
23 For Pareto’s “logico-experimental” conception of science, see 
Aron 1974, p. 115. Femia (2006, pp. 16–30) distinguishes Pareto’s 
“rational scepticism” from Comtean and Spencerian positivistic sci-
entism, noting the latter’s tendency to convert science into a “meta-
physical entity”.
24 Aron suggests Pareto would have rejected Durkheim’s “scientific 
morality” (Aron 1974, pp. 13, 116).
25 Femia compares Pareto’s ‘derivation’ to Mosca’s ‘political for-
mula’ (Femia 2006, p. 112).
26 While Pareto sometimes uses ‘residues’ as shorthand for ‘senti-
ments or instincts,’ they are intermediaries between sentiments and 
expressions or acts (Aron 1974, p. 128).
27 On Machiavelli, Mosca and Pareto, see Meisel 1962, pp. 262–285.
28 Underlying Pareto’s two types of elites in the political cycle is a 
dualistic social class division of “speculators” and “rentiers” in eco-
nomic circulation (Finer 1966, pp. 59–62).
 R. P. Jackson 
1 3
and significance of human behaviour” (Femia 2006, p. 62). 
Aron concurs that Pareto’s sociology is full of “value judge-
ment,” contrasting with his “vaunted aim” of distinguishing 
“pure science” from “displays of sentiment” (Aron 1974, p. 
167). Bellamy views Pareto as generalising his own “bitter 
characterisation of Italian politics” into “universal laws of 
human behaviour,” with unfortunate consequences that legit-
imise the “very attitudes which he had previously sought to 
condemn” (Bellamy 1987, p. 25). For Bellamy, following 
Benedetto Croce, Pareto’s analysis of human motivations 
claims to provide a value-free description of human behav-
iour, but in fact isolates chosen facts and motives. Far from 
neutral, the analysis endows “his own ideological leanings 
with a spurious scientific status” (Bellamy 1987, p. 27).
Throughout history and across different societies, accord-
ing to Pareto, ‘derivations’ change continually providing a 
great variety of justifications for action. By contrast, ‘resi-
dues’ are a relatively stable presence in human experience. 
For Aron, Pareto’s effort to catalogue the classes of ‘resi-
dues’ and ‘derivations’ amounts, albeit provisionally, to “a 
kind of equivalent in his system for a doctrine of human 
nature as such a doctrine is manifested in social life” (Aron 
1974, p. 142). Pareto’s foregrounding of generalised psychic 
states and dispositions in the motivation of human thought 
and action, with the corresponding precedence of ‘residues’ 
over ‘derivations’ in his thought, gives rise, according to 
Femia, to a tendency towards relativism (also noted by Bel-
lamy), “at least with respect to moral and philosophical pre-
cepts or theories” (Femia 2006, p. 37). The primacy Pareto 
ascribes to psychic states as a motive for action relates to his 
aforementioned engagement with Marxian thought and his 
appropriation of the Marxian “priority of practice over the-
ory” (Femia 1995, p. 375). Does Pareto’s theory of human 
behaviour substitute the economic determinism ascribed to 
Marx with a one-sided determination of human action by 
psychic states? The characterisation of Pareto’s thought by 
some commentators implies that his disillusion with “pure 
economic theory” as a means to explain human behaviour 
gives rise to an “inverted image” of this economics in his 
social theory (Bellamy 1987, p. 22).
Sympathetic readers of Pareto’s Trattato, like Aron and 
Femia, argue for a complex account of the motive factors 
of society. For Aron, Pareto’s theory is based on a “formula 
of mutual dependence” between four main variables shap-
ing social dynamics, namely interests, ‘residues,’ ‘deriva-
tions,’ and social heterogeneity (Aron 1974, p. 161).29 Pareto 
conceives the social whole as determined by the “recipro-
cal determination” of each of these aspects acting in turn 
upon the other (Pareto 1935, p. 1433). While this represents 
Pareto’s response to the economic (or interest) determinism 
ascribed to Marx, it is not a simple inversion of a mono-
causal process. Rather, as Femia explains, Pareto grasps 
society’s complexity by “substituting relationships of cause 
and effect for relationships of interdependence” (Femia 
1995, p. 375).30 Nevertheless, Femia identifies a tension 
within Pareto’s thought between the primacy of relatively 
stable psychic states (determining human behaviour) and 
society as a “system of mutually interdependent phenomena” 
(Femia 2006, p. 117). On the one hand, the primacy of ‘resi-
dues’ underlies Pareto’s endorsement of the elite principle, 
due to the “substratum of human psychology” that makes 
minority rule a permanent feature of human societies. On 
the other hand, Femia suggests that the logic of “recipro-
cal determination” involves social context and the “logic of 
social roles,” which means, “changing circumstances can 
create new patterns of thought and behaviour” (Femia 2006, 
p. 117).31
This internal tension between the primacy of ‘residues’ 
and the ‘formula of mutual dependence’ has consequences 
for Pareto’s critique of existing ‘democracies,’ which he 
saw as a form of “demagogic plutocracy” (Pareto 1935, p. 
1587). The primacy of residues, taken in isolation, implies 
a “permanent substratum of human psychology that renders 
democracy impossible” (Femia 2006, p. 117). However, the 
logic of Pareto’s “reciprocal determination,” suggests Femia, 
is that the “extension of democratic practices” could encour-
age innovative fox-like Class I tendencies among the masses, 
making them more capable of governing themselves (Femia 
2006, p. 118). This underexplored view of Pareto concern-
ing the self-activity of citizens is quite alien to the passiv-
ity engendered by Urbinati’s ‘plebiscitarian’ disfiguration 
of democracy (Urbinati 2014, p. 171). For Femia, this ten-
sion implies a measure of incoherence in Pareto’s thought, 
arising from his efforts to avoid lapsing into psychological 
reductionism. For Aron, the Trattato is, on the one hand, 
insufficiently psychological in its treatment of ‘residues,’ 
stopping short of an investigation of sentiments themselves. 
On the other, Aron believes Pareto’s analysis of the ‘circu-
lation of elites’ is overly psychological in its reduction of 
historical complexities by interpreting all elites through the 
frame of the same opposing sets of ‘residues’ (Aron 1974, 
p. 180). Pareto’s classification of elites, operating either 
through force or cunning, collapses the diversity of forms 
of government into dualism, and thus fails to “represent 
29 Pareto understands social heterogeneity as the differentiation of 
human beings into “social strata and elites” by “virtue of their psy-
chic make-up” (Finer 1966, p. 14).
30 Femia notes affinities between Pareto’s decentralised conception 
of determination and the ‘structural’ Marxism of Louis Althusser and 
Nicos Poulantzas (Femia 2006, pp. 153–4).
31 Gartman (2007) reveals a homologous debate regarding determin-
ism and autonomy with regard to Bourdieu’s social theory.
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reality in all its complexity” (Aron 1950, p. 142). The modes 
of renewal, transformation, and disintegration of elites are 
more varied than Pareto acknowledges. His translation of 
human behaviour into ‘residues,’ constrains him to an “inter-
mediary level” that is neither “particularly psychological nor 
specifically historical” (Aron 1974, p. 178). Consequently, 
Pareto’s formal sociological generalities of human nature are 
somewhat lacking in explanatory power.
The catalogue of Pareto’s opponents (“humanitarians, 
decadent bourgeois,” rational philosophers and moralists) 
illuminates the diverse interpretations of his thought (Aron 
1974, p. 171). Meisel explains the difficulty of distilling 
Pareto’s ambivalent legacy, since “in addition to being con-
sidered the bourgeoisie’s answer to Marx, Pareto could claim 
to have been, like Marx, one of its most effective grave-
diggers” (Meisel 1962, p. 9). Aron characterises Pareto’s 
style as that of an “ironic pessimist,” regarding him as the 
“spokesman for a pessimistic or cynical way of thinking 
which, fortunately, no one has ever believed in altogether, 
not even Pareto himself” (Aron 1974, pp. 18, 175). Femia 
acknowledges Pareto’s pessimism, but presents him as a 
sceptic, motivated by searching doubts rather than misan-
thropic cynicism. Thus, Femia characterises Pareto’s posi-
tion as a form of “sceptical liberalism,” tracing its origins 
back to Machiavelli (Femia 2006, p. 127). For Femia, this 
entails a commitment to the “ethical primacy of the indi-
vidual” underpinning Pareto’s anti-utopianism and anti-
universalism (Femia 2006, pp. 5, 127). Femia points to evi-
dence that Pareto’s preferred form of government is a form 
of democracy (Femia 2006, p. 120). Referring to Switzer-
land, Pareto argues that one can find the “best government 
now in existence” in “forms of direct democracy” (Pareto 
1935, p. 1568). From where does this preference arise? To 
highlight the distinctiveness of Pareto’s ‘sceptical liberal’ 
position, Femia compares his critique of Enlightenment 
notions of ‘reason’ and ‘progress’ with post-modernist rejec-
tions of grand narratives. Whereas post-modernism seeks to 
“dissolve cognitive and evaluative norms,” Pareto retains a 
“recognition of objective cognitive norms” enabling him to 
“provide some rational grounding for accepting or rejecting 
different conceptions of the good” (Femia 2006, p. 135). 
This position allows Pareto “rationally to justify adherence 
to a particular moral or political vision while still dismiss-
ing all attempts to validate that vision as a universal truth” 
(Femia 2006, p. 136).
The “living heart of Paretian thought,” in Aron’s estima-
tion, is the unpalatable idea that the ‘derivations’ that are 
more selfish and less honest are those which are often more 
useful for society. For Bellamy, Pareto’s only viable solution 
to the threat of spoliation from class struggles emerging in 
a market economy is a turn to authoritarianism (Bellamy 
1987, p. 30). Aron argues, pace Bellamy and others, that 
Pareto is not a “doctrinaire of authoritarian régimes,” but 
rather sees “democratic élites” as the “least dangerous for 
individual liberty” (Aron 1974, p. 174). Femia reads Pareto 
as exhibiting a duality of “subversive and conservative” 
aspects (Femia 2006, p. 138). The unorthodox Pareto devel-
oped in this section, despite or because of his pessimistic 
negation of ‘demagogic plutocracy,’ opens the latent poten-
tial of an extension of democratic practices.
4  Mosca and ‘Democratic Elitism’
For Finocchiaro, Mosca belongs to a tradition of ‘democratic 
elitism’ that treats the concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘elit-
ism’ as not only compatible but also interdependent. Finoc-
chiaro, following Mosca, redefines the notion of democracy 
in a realist register, as a “special relationship between elites 
and masses such that elites are open to renewal through the 
influx of elements from the masses” (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 
viii). Finocchiaro also reconstructs Mosca’s various expres-
sions of his ‘fundamental elitist principle,’ first in his 1884 
Teorica, as a “principle of minority rule,” and later in the 
Elementi as a “principle of unequal power,” and finally, in 
the 1925 republication of the Teorica, as a “methodological 
principle of leadership” (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 24).
While Mosca’s elitist principle has been “widely per-
ceived as antidemocratic,” Finocchiaro notes that it repre-
sents an objection to existing theories of democracy, rather 
than to the acceptability of well-functioning democratic 
institutions and practices (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 26). Mosca 
conceives democracy in a quantitative manner, as a tendency 
in history linked with an opposing ‘aristocratic tendency.’ 
The former measures the “social mobility” between gov-
erned and governors, whereas the latter indexes the stability 
of “social control and political power” among the inheri-
tors of the extant ‘ruling’ / ‘political class’ (Finocchiaro 
1999, p. 42). While Mosca criticises the excesses that arise 
from an unrestricted democratic tendency, he nevertheless 
regards that tendency as intertwined with a critical notion 
of “progress” in human society (Mosca 1939, p. 415). This 
division accompanies two other pairings in Mosca’s analy-
sis, between ‘autocracy’ and ‘liberty,’ and between ‘feudal-
ism’ and ‘bureaucracy,’ which constitute his classification 
of governments.32 In the former pairing, political liberty is 
conceived “as a relationship such that authority flows from 
the masses to the elites” (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 206).33 In the 
latter, Mosca expresses a sceptical, ambivalent view with 
regard to bureaucratisation in modern societies (Finocchiaro 
32 This is Mosca’s corrective to established classifications of Aristo-
tle and Montesquieu (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 46).
33 Pace above-mentioned Machiavellian influences, Mosca traces his 
definition of liberty to Guicciardini (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 43).
 R. P. Jackson 
1 3
1999, pp. 45–46). In each case, Finocchiaro points out that 
the leitmotif of Mosca’s thought (and also, he will suggest, 
Gramsci’s) is a profound “judiciousness,” namely a “con-
cern with avoiding one-sidedness and extremes” (Finoc-
chiaro 1999, p. 47).34 This ‘judiciousness’ is manifested in 
Mosca’s thought in his principle of ‘balanced pluralism,’ 
conceived, in the particular case of the form of governments, 
as “an appropriate fusing and balancing of the differing but 
constant principles and tendencies which are at work in all 
political organisms” (Mosca 1939, p. 428). For Finocchiaro, 
this principle underpins various other elements of Mosca’s 
system, such as his endorsement of mixed government, the 
separation of powers, checks and balances, the balance of 
social forces, Mosca’s “counterrevolutionary principle, and 
his ideal of meritocracy” (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 61).
Contrary to received wisdom, Finocchiaro argues that 
Mosca’s notion of ‘balanced pluralism’ is as significant 
for his thought as his elitist principle, if not more so. Thus, 
Finocchiaro suggests, “a balance of sorts can perhaps be 
forged between these two essentially by regarding elitism 
as an analytical explanatory principle and pluralism as a 
normative evaluative one” (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 22). This 
interpretation is quite distant from the “anti-pluralist aspira-
tions” of Urbinati’s ‘populist’ disfiguration of democracy 
(Urbinati 2014, p. 132). For some commentators, such as 
Ripepe (1974), the co-existence of Mosca’s elite principle 
and his pluralism is simply a sign of inconsistency. Oppos-
ing this, Finocchiaro suggests that Mosca’s ‘balanced plural-
ism’ lacks a unifying principle, and itself requires a counter-
veiling tendency, namely the elitist principle (Finocchiaro 
1999, p. 60). In sum, it is only possible to evaluate the nature 
of Mosca’s elitist principle and by extension its relation to 
democracy when “understood and evaluated in the context 
of other analytical and normative principles” constituting his 
“theoretical system” (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 202).
Finocchiaro discusses various objections to Mosca’s 
elitist principle, e.g. Meisel’s characterisation of the 
‘ruling’/‘political class’ as mythological, since it “directs 
attention to a single aspect of the social process which is 
slated to epitomize and symbolize the working of the whole” 
(Finocchiaro 1999, p. 37). Finocchiaro also acknowledges 
the cogency of Gramsci’s criticism of the lack of clarity in 
Mosca’s concept of ‘political class’ (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 
36). While Bottomore endorses Gramsci’s view of Mosca’s 
‘political class’ as a “puzzle,” he contends that Mosca’s con-
ception of ‘social forces’ that “influence and restrain” the 
‘political class’ provides a sophistication to Mosca’s con-
ception of the elite as “representing” wider groups in soci-
ety (Bottomore 1966, p. 11). As we have seen, Finocchiaro 
seeks to allay many of the objections to Mosca’s elitist 
principle that commentators have advanced by considering 
it in the context of the other principles of his system. For 
Finocchiaro, Mosca’s commitment to the elitist principle is 
not “absolute and unqualified,” but should be regarded as a 
‘tendency,’ which must be understood in combination with 
other counter-veiling tendencies (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 56).35
Finocchiaro acknowledges that his reading seeks to 
impose coherence retrospectively on Gramsci’s and Mosca’s 
positions, by “eliminating the contradictions” and “over-
looking claims which cannot be integrated with the rest” 
(Finocchiaro 1999, p. 185).36 Nevertheless, Finocchiaro 
provides an innovative image of Mosca characterised by 
a judicious and pluralistic balance between tendency and 
counter-tendency. Alongside Femia’s reading of Pareto, one 
might consider Finocchiaro’s suggestion that it would be 
theoretically fruitful to explore the relation between Pare-
to’s “principle of the oscillation of tendencies” and Mosca’s 
“balanced pluralism” (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 198). However, 
Finocchiaro hesitates regarding Pareto’s democratic creden-
tials, and whether the tradition of “democratic elitism” that 
he associates with Mosca and Gramsci can also encompass 
Pareto’s thought (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 199).37
5  ‘Disfigurations’ of Democracy?
In view of their dramatically heterogeneous approaches to 
democracy—Pareto’s ‘sceptical realism’ as against Urbi-
nati’s normative ‘proceduralism’ (Urbinati 2014, p. 8)—it 
may seem curious to employ a diagnostic developed by Urbi-
nati to analyse the ‘Italian School’ presented above. Indeed, 
Urbinati distils the challenge facing contemporary demo-
cratic theory into the maxim: “disprove Pareto” (Urbinati 
2014, p. 46). By this, Urbinati suggests that we must:
Question both the epistemic ambition of making public 
deliberation a terrain of competent knowledge, whose 
achievements have to be judged as science judges a 
technical task, and the realistic temptation of trans-
forming political opinion into a warlike arena in which 
might makes its way through words and images and 
with the consent of numbers (Urbinati 2014, p. 46).
34 Although, we might question Finocchiaro’s implication that avoid-
ing one-sidedness is always equivalent to moderation.
35 Gramsci emphasises a similar philosophical innovation of the “law 
of the tendency,” which he ascribes to David Ricardo (Gramsci 1975, 
p. 1247).
36 Finocchiaro’s methodology of reconstructing a coherent argument 
that may not exist in the texts themselves could be criticised from a 
Cambridge School perspective (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 185).
37 Finocchiaro sees Pareto’s system as “largely incommensurable 
with Mosca’s,” “substantively and methodologically” (Finocchiaro 
1999, p. 27).
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The structure of this project mirrors the bifurcation, seen 
above, characteristic of Pareto’s thought, between his con-
cern with the scientific determination of ‘logical actions,’ 
and, at the same time, his emphasis on the “paramountcy 
of the non-rational in human affairs” (Femia 2006, p. 9). 
It therefore seems appropriate to initiate some reflection 
on whether the versions of Pareto and Mosca presented by 
Femia and Finocchiaro match the “truncated, prejudicial, 
and wrong” view of democracy derived from established 
interpretations of their thought (Urbinati 2014, p. 16). In 
other words, we might ask to what extent the ‘unpolitical,’ 
‘populist’ and ‘plebiscitarian’ disfigurations of democracy, 
identified by Urbinati, continue to implicate the readings of 
Pareto and Mosca outlined above.
Both Pareto’s and Mosca’s rejection of Platonic appeals 
to an ideal of “truth” (e.g., Finocchiaro 1999, p. 53) dis-
incline them towards the ‘unpolitical’ epistemic forms of 
democracy analysed by Urbinati. Both thinkers, particularly 
Pareto, seek a more scientific approach to political analysis, 
but their scepticism towards “process[es] of rationalisation 
of collective decisions” and the potentially harmful nature 
of appeals to ‘universal truth,’ might lead us to question 
whether they are in fact guilty of “annulling or narrow-
ing the domain of doxa” (Urbinati 2014, pp. 91, 93). The 
Machiavellian inheritance, with its immanentist proclivity, 
channelled by these thinkers is not liable, unlike the pro-
tagonists of Urbinati’s ‘epistemic paradigm,’ to locate “the 
criterion for judging what is good or correct outside the 
political process” (Urbinati 2014, p. 86). While we might 
take Pareto’s assertion of the primacy of the non-rational 
in human behaviour as an exaggeratedly pessimistic view 
of opinion (and thus as ‘disfiguring’ of Urbinati’s diarchic 
structure of democracy), the readings of both thinkers above 
emphasise their careful empirical classification and study 
of the content of doxa.38 Indeed, Gramsci regards Mosca’s 
primary contribution as arising from his close attendance to 
the “techniques of the politics of subaltern classes” (Gramsci 
1975, p. 1607), providing what Finocchiaro refers to as a 
“three-dimensional elitism” (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 112).39 
Neither, as Piano notes, does Pareto’s analysis “impute to 
the masses an inherent cognitive incapacity for participat-
ing in politics” (Piano 2019, p. 528), but rather emphasises 
the durability of the complex process of the construction 
of their passivity. From this perspective, Pareto and Mosca 
would not automatically recommend entrusting controversial 
issues to panels of experts. Indeed, along with Urbinati, they 
might see democracy as best served “by keeping the pro-
cesses of judgment and will-formation open to scrutiny and 
revision and the political arena open to competing visions 
and political groups” (Urbinati 2014, p. 127). Following 
Femia, Pareto’s distinctive contribution is his valorisation 
of a ‘sceptical’ approach, including scepticism towards one’s 
own beliefs, which arguably is, alongside pragmatism, a cul-
tural pre-requisite for constructing the democratic “politics 
of compromise” advocated by Urbinati (2014, p. 139).40 
Likewise, Urbinati’s concern to guard against the “disap-
pearance of social moderation” resonates with Mosca’s 
commitment to ‘balanced pluralism’ (Finocchiaro 1999, p. 
202). Urbinati’s account of ‘moderation’ to maintain a socio-
political equilibrium draws inspiration from the Aristotelian 
tradition (Urbinati 2014, p. 140), which complements the 
‘judicious’ readings of Mosca (and Pareto) above.
How do Pareto and Mosca relate to the ‘populist’ dis-
figuration of democracy?41 Another way of posing this 
question is to ask whether Pareto’s ‘sceptical liberalism’ 
and Mosca’s ‘democratic elitism’ result in a “mono-archic 
emendation of democracy” that, Urbinati argues, emerges 
from a combination of “power verticalization and the poli-
tics of personalisation” (Urbinati 2014, p. 153). Urbinati’s 
diagnosis of populism as fundamentally a “strategic politics 
of elite transformation” appears to share some similarities 
with Pareto and Mosca’s critique of plutocratic elites that 
disguise themselves as democrats (Urbinati 2014, p. 157). 
Having defined his position through a critique of the con-
centration of power under socialism, we can see Mosca as 
firmly opposed to, as Urbinati puts it, “populism’s anti-
pluralist aspirations” (Urbinati 2014, p. 132). Contrary to 
‘plebiscitarian’ disfigurations that render subaltern groups 
as voiceless masses watching the actions of leaders, Mosca’s 
conception of political liberty “depends on the existence of 
a balanced pluralism of social forces and of leading groups” 
(Finocchiaro 1999, p. 169). Directly opposite to the ‘unpo-
litical’ disfiguration, populism and plebiscitarian-ism is 
characterised for Urbinati by its “radical rejection of indi-
vidual judgment in politics” (Urbinati 2014, p. 191). Can we 
describe Pareto and Mosca as sharing in this rejection? For 
38 Although, Pareto’s ironic pessimism bears some resemblance to 
“Plato’s sarcasm at the lover of the demos” (Urbinati 2014, p. 14). 
For Piano, the Italian School’s pessimism is central to its contribution 
to opening “possibilities for democracy” through a “self-conscious 
confrontation with fundamental obstacles to human flourishing” 
(Piano 2019, p. 525).
39 Gramsci compares Mosca’s ‘political class’ with Pareto’s élite, 
considering both as forms of the “attempt to interpret the historical 
phenomenon of intellectuals and their function in state and social 
life” (Gramsci 1975, p. 956).
40 Femia defends Pareto’s ‘sceptical liberalism’ against accusations 
of nihilism, while acknowledging its “politically indeterminate” char-
acter (Femia 2006, p. 134).
41 Here, Urbinati defines populism as “both a movement and a form 
of democracy” whose “true and radical target” is representative 
democracy; it is “a style of politics and a way of making a democracy 




Femia, Pareto’s “critique of demagogic plutocracy stemmed 
from a desire to safeguard liberal individualism against the 
encroachments of the leviathan state” (Femia 2006, p. 118). 
Indeed, Urbinati notes that she targets contemporary plebi-
scitarian theorists that endorse minority rule, rather than 
figures like Mosca that “lament the ruling power of the few 
despite the proclaimed triumph of the masses” (Urbinati 
2014, p. 196).
Pareto’s critique of ‘demagogic plutocracy’ can be read 
at face value as unrelentingly hostile to liberal democracy 
(Femia 2006, p. 105). His criticisms of “plutocracy advanc-
ing under a democratic guise,” as Piano points out, have 
often been transformed into “celebrations of an elite-ena-
bling and mass-constraining model” (Piano 2019, p. 525). 
While Mosca is well-known for his trenchant criticism of 
parliamentary systems and the “plutocratic transforma-
tion of liberalism,” following the experience of fascism, he 
“attributed to the representative system the highest degree of 
‘juridical defence’ against elite domination” (Piano 2019, p. 
526). Reframing the tradition of these Italian theorists, Piano 
reveals that the later reception of Pareto and Mosca down-
played their concern for “political transparency” regarding 
plutocratic domination.42 Consequently, their pessimistic 
outlook provides overlooked resources for the renewal of 
democracy that can act “as a subversive tool disrupting the 
domination of a particular ruling class” (Piano 2019, p. 
527). For Urbinati, democracy is not restricted to a “quest 
for political power,” rather it is also “a claim for an extension 
of the values of equality and nondomination to those sectors 
of social life where those values are still impotent” (Urbinati 
2014, p. 165).43 The aforementioned resources of Pareto and 
Mosca, in particular their anti-plutocratic insights, contrib-
ute to Urbinati’s “wider project of democratization” that 
“orient[s] itself also outside the space of political power 
and toward civil society at large” and “questions and chal-
lenges” the “existing distribution of power” (Urbinati 2014, 
pp. 165–6).
While making distinctive claims for their respective 
thinkers, Femia’s and Finocchiaro’s readings draw Pareto 
and Mosca into closer proximity with each other than these 
interpreters themselves might be willing to countenance. 
Both interpretations share a strong emphasis on the ‘judi-
ciousness’ of their thought (e.g., Femia 2006, p. 112, Finoc-
chiaro 1999, pp. 47, 151, 162, 169), while Femia develops 
the ‘sceptical’ position found in Pareto. The emphasis on 
the balanced poise of their works stands in contrast with 
much of the traditional reception of their ideas and is less 
‘disfiguring’ of democracy than hitherto acknowledged. 
When rendered in their ‘sceptical’ and ‘judicious’ forms, 
recognising the internal tensions animating their writings, I 
would suggest that Pareto and Mosca pose a philosophical 
challenge that is more conceptually productive than com-
monly assumed. Piano summarises the contribution of this 
‘Italian disposition’ as “the inclination to honestly expose 
the deficiencies of elite rule in order to encourage a greater 
striving for democracy and popular sovereignty” (Piano 
2019, p. 529). In this light, not as “elite theorists of democ-
racy,” but as “democratic theorists of elitism” (Piano 2019, 
p. 525), they warrant continued re-examination to address 
the unpolitical, populist and plebiscitarian challenges con-
fronting democracy in the twenty-first century.
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